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When Art Might Constitute a Taking: 
A Takings Clause Inquiry Under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act 
ABSTRACT 
At first glance, a federal statute protecting the moral rights of 
artists and their artwork seems like a unanimous victory. But it turns 
out that government action protecting certain works of art attached to 
buildings may give rise to a valid takings clause claim under the Fifth 
Amendment. Without compensation, a regulation requiring a landowner 
to maintain someone else’s property on his land would constitute a 
taking. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) requires 
landowners to maintain protected artwork attached to buildings or 
potentially face statutory damages. Although only one court has heard 
and subsequently denied a takings argument in the VARA context, in  
the highly contextual nature of the statute, there are still compelling 
arguments to be made that VARA-protected art may constitute a taking. 
This Note provides background on both VARA and the takings clause 
and provides various arguments that a VARA landowner-defendant 
could utilize to avoid liability. 
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Imagine that you have just bought a new building in anticipation 
of opening a trendy new restaurant in Nashville. Before opening, one of 
the first things you want to do is redecorate your new building to match 
the restaurant’s trendy theme, which includes replacing a mural on the 
side of the building that does not match your desired aesthetic. Instead, 
you would like to put up a new mural that is more likely to attract 
patrons to your restaurant for Instagram-worthy pictures. A few weeks 
after finishing the new mural and opening your new restaurant, 
someone you have never met before approaches you and lets you know 
that she is suing you for destroying her previously popular mural. Does 
an artist really have a say in how you use the property you own? Under 
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), an artist may in fact be able to 
control how another person can use his property if there is protected 
artwork attached to the property.1 
Congress enacted VARA in 1990 as an amendment to the 
Copyright Act to provide protection for the “moral rights” of artists.2 
VARA states that an artist has a lifetime right to prevent any 
intentional or grossly negligent destruction, distortion, or any other 
modification of artwork that is of “recognized stature.”3 Section 113(d) 
of VARA applies these rights to works of recognized stature 
incorporated into buildings in such a way that the property owner 
cannot remove the work from the building without violating the artist’s 
rights.4 As a result, VARA potentially allows an artist to control the use 
of another person’s property in its attempt to balance the economic 
rights of property owners with the moral rights of artists.5 In this 
balancing act, VARA may give rise to a landowner having a legitimate 
claim under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.6  
 
 1. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 604, § 113(d), 104 Stat. 
5128, 5130–31 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)); cf. Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 
F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995). For a comparable situation, see Adam Sparks, Why Vanderbilt Painted 
Over Traditional Coach Mural After 27 Years, THE TENNESSEAN, https://www.tennes-
sean.com/story/sports/college/vanderbilt/2019/08/19/vanderbilt-coaches-mural-nashville-west-
end/2049731001/ [https://perma.cc/Y7VH-X8HE] (Aug. 20, 2019, 1:15 PM).  
 2. Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citation  
omitted) (“[M]oral rights afford protection for the author’s personal, non-economic interests in  
receiving attribution for her work, and in preserving the work in the form in which it was created, 
even after its sale or licensing.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 71 
F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a), (d). 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d); Christopher J. Robinson, Note, The “Recognized Stature” Standard 
in the Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1945 (2000). 
 5. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1935. 
 6. William L. Charron & Jason S. Mencher, Painting Your Way to a Lifetime Tenancy 
Through the Visual Artists Rights Act, 95 BNA’S PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 196 (2017), 
2021] VARA AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 921 
This Note argues that, in the highly contextual nature of VARA 
cases, § 113(d) may give rise to a valid takings clause argument against 
the artist. Because of this possibility, courts should keep the takings 
doctrine in mind when balancing a property owner’s economic rights 
with an artist’s moral rights. Part I provides background on VARA 
within the larger scope of copyright law and the history of the takings 
clause. Part II applies a potential takings inquiry to VARA and 
recognizes certain hurdles that such a takings argument must 
overcome. Part III lays out potential takings arguments that a 
defendant could utilize to potentially escape VARA liability. 
Additionally, Part III contends that Congress and the courts should 
more aptly balance economic property rights with VARA’s moral rights 
when a work of visual art cannot be removed from a building without 
injury to the art and there is no waiver signed by the artist.7 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VARA 
When the United States finally signed onto the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989, 
the United States symbolically accepted the treaty’s conception of moral 
rights in connection with works of visual art.8 The Berne Convention 
addresses moral rights in article 6bis: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said 
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object 
to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.9 
However, the United States did not immediately amend the 
Copyright Act to comply with the Berne Convention’s concept of moral 
rights.10 US law resisted recognizing moral rights in part because of the 
conflict moral rights have with traditional common law property 
 
https://pryorcashman.gjassets.com/content/uploads/2020/03/BBNA-Insight-Final-PryorCashman-
Charron-Mencher.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UY6-Y9LR]. The takings clause states that private  
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 7. See Eric E. Bensen, Note, The Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990: Why Moral Rights 
Cannot Be Protected Under the United States Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1127, 1129 n.3 
(1996). 
 8. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of 
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 945 (1990); Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 99-27 (1986), 1161 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 9. Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6bis. 
 10. Damich, supra note 8, at 945–46.  
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rights.11 Despite the delay, a year after joining the Berne Convention, 
Congress passed the first federal moral rights law in connection with 
visual art, the Visual Artists Rights Act.12 
VARA grants lifetime moral rights to authors of works of visual 
art.13 Moral rights are personal, noneconomic rights that artists have 
tied to their works.14 The term “moral rights” is translated from the 
French phrase “droit moral,” relating to an author’s ability to control 
the eventual fate of the author’s art.15 As a result of the French 
translation, the term “moral rights” is a misnomer because moral rights 
have nothing to do with a traditional sense of morals.16  
VARA’s purpose is to protect two specific moral rights of  
artists: the rights of “integrity” and “attribution.”17 The right of 
integrity allows an artist to prevent any deformation or mutilation to 
his work, even after title to the work has been transferred, as long as 
the work is of “recognized stature.”18 The right of attribution grants an 
artist the right to be recognized by name as the creator of a work, which 
includes the right to prevent the use of the artist’s name on deformed 
art originally produced by the artist.19 These rights are not transferable 
but are waivable if signed in a written instrument by the artist.20 This 
Note focuses primarily on how an artist’s right of integrity under VARA 
might infringe upon a building owner’s property rights. 
 
 11. Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Until 
recently it was accepted wisdom that the United States did not enforce any claim of moral rights” 
(quoting Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997))); Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 
F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 8D–15 (1994)) (“The obligation of the United States to provide droit moral . . . was the single 
most contentious issue surrounding Berne adherence.” (quoting 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND PRACTICE 1022 (1994))). 
 12. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). On December 1, 1990, the Visual Artists Rights Act 
was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush as Title VI to the Judicial Improvements Act 
of 1990. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. 
 13. Robinson, supra note 4, at 1936. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists 
Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 379 (1995). 
 16. Id. 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B); Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(citing RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 420 (1989)). 
 19. Carter, 71 F.3d at 81 (first citing RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART  
LAW 419–20 (1989); and then citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON  
COPYRIGHT § 8D–5 (1994)); see Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 985 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (citing Carter, 71 F.3d at 81). 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (e). 
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While VARA is a victory for artists’ rights and has a 
commendable purpose, many of the statute’s biggest advocates also note 
that it does not offer the broad moral rights protections enjoyed 
throughout Europe and does not bring US law into full conformity with 
the Berne Convention.21 One important distinction between VARA and 
the Berne Convention is the duration of protection. While VARA offers 
protection for the life of the artist, the Berne Convention’s article 6bis 
requires that moral rights last for the entire length of copyright 
protection.22 Under VARA, for works created before June 1, 1991, if the 
author retains a copy of the work, moral rights protection lasts for the 
life of the author plus seventy years.23 If the artist did not retain a copy 
of the work, then the artist possesses no moral rights for the artwork 
created before June 1, 1991.24 Additionally, article 6bis applies to all 
literary and artistic works, whereas VARA only applies to “works of 
visual art,”25 with some notable exceptions.26  
VARA protects works created on or after June 1, 1991, offering 
moral rights protection for the lifetime of the author.27 Because VARA 
does not offer as broad of protection as seen elsewhere, states have the 
ability to enact statutes to bring moral rights protection closer to the 
requirements existing within the Berne Convention.28 These state 
statutes generally provide broader protection than what VARA offers 
and restrict the alienability of moral rights.29 
 
 21. Damich, supra note 8, at 947; Laura Gilbert, Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Is  
Failing, ARTSY (Sept. 29, 2015, 10:20 AM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-why-the-
visual-artists-rights-act-is-failing-to-protect-street-art-and-murals [https://perma.cc/BA48-
W2MV]. 
 22. Damich, supra note 8, at 947. 
 23. Jana S. Farmer & Adam Bialek, Where Moral Rights May Conflict with the Removal 
of Confederate Statues, LAW.COM (Dec. 11, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/where-moral-
rights-may-conflict-073005258.html [https://perma.cc/Z8EH-LYBM]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6bis; Damich, supra note 8, at 947. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 for the statutory definition of a “work of visual art.” 
 26. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 27. Robinson, supra note 4, at 1935–36. 
 28. Damich, supra note 8, at 947–48. 
 29. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B), 3(B) (West 2020) (defining “fine art” as “any 
original work of visual or graphic art of any media . . . of recognized quality”); 5 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 5-62-2(20), 4(a) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-116s(2), -116t (2019); CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 987–89 (West 2020); 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2102–05, 2107 (West 2020); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 2020). New York’s moral rights statute emphasizes 
the value of an artist’s reputation, rather than the intrinsic value of the particular piece of art. As 
a result, display of a mutilated original piece of art is prohibited only if the artist’s name is  
associated with it. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 2020). The passage of VARA 
puts the enforceability of state moral rights statutes into question due to federal preemption.  
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The enforcement mechanism of VARA allows for violations of an 
artist’s moral rights to be subject to all civil copyright remedies.30 These 
copyright remedies allow a court to grant an injunction to the artist to 
prevent destruction, mutilation, or any other alteration of a qualifying 
work.31 Artists may also seek monetary damages under the statute, 
either actual damages or statutory damages.32 For statutory damages, 
a court may award anywhere from $750 to $30,000 per copyrighted 
work, and this can be increased to $150,000 per work if the copyright 
infringement was willful.33 While other copyrighted works must be 
registered before infringement to be eligible for statutory damages, 
VARA-protected works do not have to be registered anywhere to recover 
statutory damages or attorneys’ fees.34 
A. Moral Rights in the United States Pre-VARA 
Before VARA in the United States, artists were traditionally 
denied any moral rights protections.35 For example, in the 1949 case 
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, a church painted over a mural 
portraying a bare-chested Jesus because the church’s parishioners felt 
like the mural overly emphasized Jesus’s physical features in lieu of his 
spiritual qualities.36 After the church painted over the mural, the artist 
of the mural brought a suit to either compel damages or restore the 
original painting, arguing that general customs in the art world dictate 
that works of high artistic standards should not be altered or 
destroyed.37 Additionally, the artist argued that he had a continued 
“limited proprietary interest” in his work after its sale to reasonably 
protect his honor and reputation as an artist, which included his right 
to prevent the work from any alteration or destruction.38 However, 
while acknowledging that moral rights are recognized elsewhere, the 
court held that the concept of moral rights had not received acceptance 
under US law.39 The Crimi court found that when the artist sold the 
 
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 605, § 301, 104 Stat. 5128, 5131  
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301). 
 30. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1972. 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 502. 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
 34. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1937–38. 
 35. Chintan Amin, Note, Keep Your Filthy Hands Off My Painting! The Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990 and the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 315, 319 (1995). 
 36. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 818 (quoting Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947)). 
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mural to the church, he transferred all his rights, title, and interest in 
the mural.40  
Crimi’s holding that artists do not retain rights in their work 
after sale was typical for its time in the United States.41 However, some 
artists looked outside of copyright law to find remedies in contract law 
and the tort of unfair competition.42 It was not until 1976 that a US 
court recognized artists’ moral rights as a cause of action in Gilliam v. 
American Broadcasting Companies.43 In Gilliam, members of the 
popular comedy group “Monty Python” sued the American Broadcast 
Companies (ABC) under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act44 for violating 
the integrity of their television show by substantially editing the show’s 
content that the network found obscene.45 Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act seeks to prevent misrepresentations made that may injure a 
person’s business or personal reputation.46 The Gilliam court found  
that the edited version of the show substantially departed from and 
impaired the integrity of Monty Python’s work because the comedy 
group had retained control over the scripts via copyright law.47 Despite 
acknowledging that US law did not presently recognize moral rights, 
the court recognized that the foundations of US copyright law could not 
be reconciled with an artist’s inability to obtain relief for the mutilation 
or misrepresentation of their work to the public. Thus, a cause of action 
for moral rights was born.48 
 
 40. Id. at 819. This raises an interesting question of whether, under VARA, an artist may 
still hold some form of ownership over the artwork itself, separate from intellectual property. See 
id. 
 41. Amin, supra note 35, at 319–20; see Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (first quoting Vargas v. 
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); and then quoting Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
25 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)). 
 42. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 587–88 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that substantial 
cutting of an original work constitutes misrepresentation in contract law); Prouty v. Nat’l Broad. 
Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 265–66 (D. Mass. 1939) (finding an author had a valid cause of action under 
the tort of misrepresentation when her novel was broadcast on television in inferior artistic and 
commercial quality). 
 43. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1976).  
 44. See Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). The Lanham Act is the federal statute that governs trademarks, 
service marks, and unfair competition. 
 45. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 17–18. 
 46. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 47. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25.  
 48. See id.  
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B. Moral Rights Protection Under VARA 
The first case to interpret VARA was Carter v.  
Helmsley–Spear.49 The facts in the thought experiment found in the 
introductory paragraph of this Note are based on the facts from Carter. 
However, instead of a mural as the art in question, in Carter, the US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enjoined a building owner from 
removing a large sculpture that occupied most of the lobby of his 
building.50 The defendants became owners of the building that housed 
the sculpture through a bankruptcy proceeding and then informed the 
artists that they intended to remove the art from the building.51 As a 
result, the artists sued under VARA and successfully received an 
injunction to protect the sculpture from removal.52  
When other circuits have interpreted VARA, property rights 
tend to triumph over an artist’s moral rights.53 While some proponents 
of VARA might describe the burdens imposed on property owners as 
light, consisting of giving notice to the artist and waiting ninety days 
for the artist to remove the art, the question then becomes how a VARA 
case could ever transpire.54 A common reoccurring issue in VARA cases 
is failure to give notice to artists.55 Eric Bjorgum, a prominent VARA 
plaintiffs’ lawyer, states that property owners simply do not know about 
VARA.56 In his practice, Bjorgum has noticed that once property owners 
become aware of VARA, they become far less likely to ever have art on 
buildings, which has negative consequences for not only the artist but 
the general public as well.57 
Additionally, the ambiguities within the statute related to the 
recognized stature standard could lead to excessive litigation and 
confusion for both the parties involved and the courts.58 Even if a party 
is aware of VARA, there still may be a question of whether the artwork 
is of recognized stature and therefore even offered any protection. The 
statute itself does not define “recognized stature.” However, one bill 
introduced to Congress before VARA’s enactment instructed courts to 
look to expert opinion in deciding the stature of a particular work of 
 
 49. See Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 50. Id. at 80–81, 88. 
 51. Id. at 80–81. 
 52. Id. at 81. 
 53. See Gilbert, supra note 21. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 324–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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art.59 In practice, the Carter court stated that a plaintiff must show that 
the art possesses stature in the viewpoints of art experts, members of 
the artistic community, or by society in general.60 As a whole, the 
recognized stature standard departs from traditional copyright 
principles because, prior to VARA, copyright law had not given 
additional rights to copyrightable works based on quality.61 However, 
any moral rights statute that offers protection to artwork regardless of 
quality would certainly be overbroad.62 
In one recent situation in Nashville, a local muralist made waves 
by contacting various news organizations after Vanderbilt University 
unilaterally decided to paint over one of his murals that depicted the 
coaches of the university’s sports programs.63 Before its removal, the 
mural had stood for twenty-seven years and undergone numerous 
updates as coaches came and went.64 According to the artist, the 
painting had become “iconic” to the area.65 However, through the years, 
not everyone thought the mural was iconic in the same way. In fact,  
the same mural faced complaints from Vanderbilt’s NAACP chapter 
accusing the depiction of former Vanderbilt football coach Derek  
Mason as being reminiscent of the minstrelsy era in which race was 
exaggerated in art.66 Because Vanderbilt destroyed the mural without 
informing the artist, he might have a convincing claim under VARA. 
However, the line between protected “recognized stature” and 
unprotected art would certainly be an unclear distinction. 
VARA has recently come back into the spotlight in the aftermath 
of the Second Circuit’s decision in Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P.67 In 
Castillo, the art in question was a graffiti-covered compound in New 
 
 59. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1619 Before the Subcomm. on 
Pats., Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 17 (1987)  
(statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).  
 60. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325. 
 61. Robinson, supra note 4, at 1945. 
 62. Id. at 1946. One article contends that the “stature” standard is a higher bar than one 
requiring “quality.” See Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral 
Rights, 15 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 905, 916–17 (1993). 
 63. Sparks, supra note 1.  
 64. Id. 
 65. See Matthew Torres, Vanderbilt Coaches Mural Painted Over Without Artist Knowing, 
WTVF, https://www.newschannel5.com/news/vanderbilt-coaches-mural-painted-over-without-art-
ist-knowing [https://perma.cc/U9JU-369F] (Aug. 19, 2019, 8:21 PM). 
 66. Nick Cole, Derek Mason Mural to Be Redone After Complaints, THE TENNESSEAN, 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/college/vanderbilt/2014/03/31/vanderbilt-coach-derek-
mason-painting/7113205/ [https://perma.cc/9XJR-8Z2P] (Apr. 2, 2014, 12:40 AM).  
 67. See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d 
sub nom. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 
(2020) (mem.); Charron & Mencher, supra note 6. 
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York known as 5Pointz.68 During its existence, the 5Pointz compound 
housed approximately 10,650 works of art of differing quality and 
lifespans.69 In May 2013, one of the contributing artists learned that 
property developers sought approval from the city to destroy 5Pointz in 
order to build luxury apartments on the site.70 In response, the artist 
applied to make 5Pointz a site of cultural significance, but his 
application was unsuccessful.71 The artist then turned to VARA and 
sued the property developer to prevent destruction of the compound and 
the accompanying art.72 
In Castillo, first heard by the US District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York in 2013, the court explicitly recognized that the 
rights created by VARA are in tension with traditional notions of 
property rights and attempted to balance the artists’ rights and the 
property owners’ rights.73 The court rejected the plaintiff’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction and did not interfere with the developer’s desire 
to tear down the compound so that he could build the luxury apartments 
but cautioned the developer that he could be exposed to significant 
monetary damages if the court ultimately determined that the artworks 
were of “recognized stature” under VARA.74 The developer completely 
ignored the court’s warning about damages and began to destroy the 
compound that same night.75 Ultimately, the court found that forty-five 
of the aerosol works had achieved recognized stature and the developer 
had violated VARA by destroying them.76 The district court awarded 
statutory damages set at $150,000 for each work, totaling $6.75 million 
in damages.77 Persuaded by the seemingly bad faith acts on the part of 
the developer, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment 
in early 2020.78 
Around the same time the Second Circuit awarded damages in 
Castillo, the US Copyright Office conducted a study to determine 
whether the government should expand moral rights protections under 
 
 68. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 162. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 163. 
 73. Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Cohen 
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US law.79 Published on April 23, 2019, the report concluded that “moral 
rights and contract law [are] ‘generally working well and should not be 
changed.’ At the current time, ‘there is no need for the creation of a 
blanket moral rights statute.’”80 If Congress ever attempts to amend the 
moral rights framework in US law, this report could serve as a roadmap 
for Congress to follow.81 However, any moral rights expansion in the 
United States may face staunch opposition, much of which can be traced 
back to cultural differences between the United States and European 
countries that offer broad moral rights protection.82 
C. A VARA Takings Argument in Court 
Only one VARA case has featured a potential takings  
argument: Carter v. Helmsley–Spear.83 In Carter, briefly discussed 
above, the district court enjoined a building’s owners from removing a 
large sculpture from the building’s lobby, even though the art occupied 
most of the lobby’s space.84 The defendants attempted to argue that 
requiring the statue to remain on their property was a per se taking in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment because an injunction would give the 
artist the right to control the use of the defendant’s property.85 The 
court, emphasizing the substantial burdens faced by the defendants in 
making the takings argument, was not persuaded.86 The Carter court 
found that no taking had occurred because there was no permanent 
physical invasion, noting that VARA protection lasts only for the  
life of the author and is therefore neither a facial nor as applied  
 
 79. Sam Berten, A Call for the Expansion of the Visual Artists Rights Act, UNIV. OF CIN. 
L. REV. BLOG (June 9, 2020), https://uclawreview.org/2020/06/09/a-call-for-the-expansion-of-the-
visual-artists-rights-act/#_ednref8 [https://perma.cc/AA2N-7DT8]; Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright 
Law, COPYRIGHTLAWS.COM (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.copyrightlaws.com/moral-rights-in-u-s-
copyright-law/ [https://perma.cc/L6PE-NEJZ]; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND 
INTEGRITY: EXAMINING MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2019). 
 80. Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 79. The Copyright Office’s report  
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79, at 5. 
 81. Berten, supra note 79; see Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 79.  
 82. Berten, supra note 79. 
 83. Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in 
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 84. Id. at 337. 
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permanent physical invasion.87 Additionally, the Carter court stated 
that preservation of artwork through VARA may make some properties 
more valuable by generating public interest in the sites.88 The court 
found that the building owners were already compensated by the artist 
because of a supposed increase in property value as a result of the 
sculpture’s existence attached to the building.89 
While the takings arguments were of primary focus in front of 
the district court in Carter, the Second Circuit did not address the issue 
at all.90 On appeal, the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s 
ruling as a result of its finding that the artists were employees and not 
independent contractors, rendering them ineligible for VARA 
protection.91 
II. WHEN VARA MIGHT BE A TAKING 
A. VARA as a Per Se Physical Invasion 
Requiring a landowner to maintain an artist’s artwork on his 
land as a result of VARA could potentially be a per se physical invasion 
if the occupation is considered permanent.92 At first glance, a VARA 
defendant may have difficulty arguing that VARA-protected artwork is 
“permanent” because of the fact that the statute only confers a lifetime 
right of protection.93 However, despite this hurdle, a landowner may be 
able to persuade a court that the invading artwork is “permanent,” not 
in the durational sense, but by comparing the statute to other 
regulations that appeared limited in duration and were still found to be 
permanent.94 
Even though VARA protection explicitly only lasts for the 
lifetime of the artist, a court still may consider any attached artwork as 
a permanent invasion of another’s property because the distinction 
between temporary and permanent in the takings analysis is far  
from clear.95 The answer surprisingly does not necessarily boil down  
to an infinite duration of occupation. Rather, the Supreme Court has  
 
 87. Id. at 327–28. 
 88. Id. at 328. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 326–27; Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 91. Carter, 71 F.3d at 88. 
 92. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1982). 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).  
 94. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 95. See Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 59–61 (2017). 
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focused on whether the invading material exclusively occupies a space, 
comparing a traveler walking on the street to a telephone pole.96  
The Supreme Court has found invasions that exclusively occupy 
space within another’s property to be permanent, even if the invasion 
is not infinite in duration.97 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., a per se physical invasion occurred when a New York 
statute required a landowner to permit a cable television company to 
install its equipment on her property.98 However, as noted by the 
dissent, the regulation did not require the television equipment to 
remain in place permanently, but only so long as the property remained 
residential and the company wanted to maintain the equipment.99 
Essentially, a telephone pole, cable television equipment, or a work of 
art attached to a building could only be invading another person’s 
property for a limited period of time, but still be considered “permanent” 
under a takings analysis because of the exclusive occupation of another 
person’s land.  
Similar to Loretto, VARA sanctions an exclusive occupation of 
someone else’s physical property with the property of another person.100 
When a mural occupies a wall of a building, the artwork takes the space 
occupied by the art from the building owner because he can no longer 
fully utilize the wall bound to the artwork. As a result, even though a 
VARA invasion does not appear to be permanent in a durational  
sense, a landowner may have a fighting chance in persuading a  
court that the statute meets the requirements of a per se physical  
invasion.101 If a court does consider the invasion as permanent, a  
landowner-defendant’s chances of success in the argument likely 
increase substantially. 
If the invasion is considered permanent for takings analysis 
purposes, VARA may also give rise to the artist holding a nonpossessory 
interest in the use of the property.102 A person with a nonpossessory 
interest in a property has the right to use or restrict the use of another 
person’s land, even though he does not hold any title to the property.103 
In the VARA context, when a work of art attached to a building is 
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protected under the statute, the artist has a nonpossessory interest in 
the use of the property because the landowner can no longer fully use 
that space how he sees fit. The artist can dictate how the landowner 
fully utilizes his property by forbidding any destruction, mutilation, or 
alteration of the artwork attached to the building, even though the 
artist does not hold any title to the artwork. In this sense, VARA  
may create a quasi-easement held by artists, potentially denying a 
landowner his traditional property rights.104 
B. VARA as a Regulatory Taking 
Enjoining a landowner from fully using his property or forcing 
him to endure a decrease in value as a result of VARA’s existence could 
be a regulatory taking. However, under the relevant total regulatory 
takings analysis, a VARA defendant will likely struggle in establishing 
the loss of all economic value of the property.105 As a result, the analysis 
for a regulatory taking claim for VARA would likely proceed under the 
Penn Central factors.106 The Penn Central factors require a court to 
consider the character of the invasion, the economic impact of the 
regulation applied to the property, and the property owner’s distinct 
investment-backed expectations related to the property.107 Regarding 
the character of the governmental invasion factor, the Court stated  
that a taking is more likely to have occurred when the interference  
with the property is a physical invasion by the government and not 
merely adjusting economic factors.108 Using Penn Central, a  
landowner may try to argue that VARA consists of a total regulatory 
taking of a smaller property interest within the larger bundle of 
property rights.109 
For example, VARA may deprive a property owner of the right 
to exclude others from her land, namely the artist. This would be a 
complete loss of the right to exclude that is less than the whole bundle 
of rights but would still be a taking. Despite conflicting rulings about 
whether a total regulatory taking may apply to a smaller property 
interest within the whole property, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island made 
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clear the possibility of a compensable takings claim regarding small 
physical occupations.110 In Palazzolo, the court rejected a landowner’s 
takings argument after a land use moratorium resulted in his property 
depreciating in value from $3,150,000 to $200,000 because the 
regulation did not fully eliminate all property value.111 However, the 
Palazzolo court clearly articulated that a diminution of value case may 
well warrant compensation and that notice of the regulation does not 
prohibit recovery.112  
In the expensive New York real estate market featured in 
Castillo, VARA could have significantly depreciated the value of the 
graffiti-covered warehouses if the landowners could not develop the 
valuable real estate.113 While small losses of value resulting from the 
relevant regulation generally do not constitute compensable takings, 
the situation in Castillo could result in substantial depreciation of 
value.114  
In applying the Penn Central factors to a hypothetical temporary 
takings argument in Castillo, the real estate developers possessed an 
arguably reasonable, investment-backed expectation that they could 
develop the land they owned as they saw fit.115 The question then 
becomes whether the artists’ moral rights and the public’s interest in 
protecting artwork of recognized stature outweigh the developers’ 
traditional property rights. Arguably, the developers’ property interests 
along with the relevant land use efficiency arguments outweigh the 
artists’ rights and the preservation of artwork.116 
A VARA defendant may also be able to argue that the 
requirement to maintain the artwork and prohibit removal is a 
temporary regulatory taking.117 A temporary regulatory taking occurs 
when a regulation temporarily prohibits a landowner from fully using 
his land.118 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los 
Angeles, the Supreme Court found a taking occurred after a local 
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ordinance temporarily prohibited a church from constructing a 
recreational area for disabled children.119 In its holding, the Court 
emphasized that the temporary regulatory takings inquiry must focus 
directly upon the severity of the burden that VARA imposes upon 
private property rights.120 Therefore, a court should not inquire into the 
motivation or purpose behind VARA, its value or benefit, or the 
correctness or effectiveness of the Copyright Office’s implementation.121 
Instead, the key to the takings analysis here is answering whether 
VARA is “functionally comparable to government appropriation or 
invasion of private property.”122 
In certain contexts, VARA can be functionally comparable to an 
invasion of private property if the government requires a landowner to 
maintain someone else’s property on his land.123 Similar to First 
English, a landowner could be enjoined from developing, remodeling, or 
even fully utilizing the land during the statutory period of protection.124 
If the graffiti artwork in Castillo ended up temporarily prohibiting 
development, the landowners could have had a persuasive argument 
that VARA was a temporary regulatory taking because the statute is 
comparable to the government invading private property.125 
C. How VARA May Affect a Property’s Value and Use 
If a court enjoins a landowner from removing unwanted artwork 
attached to a building as a result of VARA, the art may become an 
encumbrance on the property.126 An encumbrance lessens the value, 
use, or enjoyment of a property.127 Even though the landowner still may 
be able to sell the property containing the artwork, the value of the 
property may decrease as a result of the physical occupation.128 Because 
encumbrances can have an adverse effect on a property’s value or use, 
buyers must perform their due diligence in any real estate purchase to 
identify any potential encumbrances, such as a lien or restrictive 
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covenant, before completing the transaction.129 As a result, when 
dealing with a property that has artwork attached, it is best practice to 
find the artist and have him sign a waiver of all VARA rights. However, 
sometimes building owners act first before asking these questions. In 
the defense of the landowners who do act first and then face a potential 
VARA lawsuit, VARA imposes no requirement that artists register 
their works with the US Copyright Office to be eligible for statutory 
damages. As a result, even though ignorance of law is never an excuse, 
a landowner could think that she is acting with no risk given that there 
is no way for the owner to tell whether VARA protects the artwork 
before acting. 
If courts remain unwilling to find certain VARA-protected 
artwork as a taking, artists, rather than landowners, are more likely to 
feel the effects. As landowners catch wind of VARA damages paid by 
other property owners for unsuspectingly using their own property, 
landowners may become increasingly wary of hiring artists to paint 
murals or create other art attached to buildings. Having a judge rather 
than the free market determine the success of a particular piece of art 
may lead to doubts about the true merits of a work of art.130 If more 
people become less inclined to install artwork on their properties and 
people become increasingly suspicious of the true merits of quality 
artwork, VARA may have detrimental effects for both the art profession 
and society as a whole. 
III. POTENTIAL TAKINGS ARGUMENTS IN THE VARA CONTEXT 
At a minimum, traditional notions of property rights clash with 
an artist’s moral rights under VARA.131 This Part explores potential 
takings arguments in the VARA context, concluding that there very 
well may be instances in which a landowner may have a valid takings 
argument in defense to a VARA lawsuit.  
A. Evaluating the Takings Arguments Made in Carter 
Even though the defendants in Carter failed to convince the 
Southern District of New York that requiring a large sculpture 
occupying their building’s lobby to remain in the building resulted in a 
taking, the court very well could have decided the case differently.132 In 
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its ruling, the court compared VARA’s mandate to Penn Central’s 
preservation laws.133 However, while analogous, VARA’s main purpose 
lies in protecting the rights of artists, not in historical preservation of 
the arts.134  
In focusing heavily on the fact that VARA protection is only  
a lifetime right limited in duration, the court misapplied the  
temporary-permanent distinction displayed in Loretto.135 Recall that 
the Loretto court struck down the regulation at issue in that case even 
though the statute did not require the cable television to remain in place 
forever, but only so long as the building remained residential and the 
company wanted the equipment in place.136 Similarly, in the VARA 
context, protectable artwork attached to a building must remain in 
place if it is of recognized stature and the artist wishes the work to 
stay.137 Just like a telephone pole that may only physically invade 
someone else’s property for a finite period of time, the space that the 
artwork occupies is exclusive, and therefore, should be considered 
permanent.138 
Additionally, in finding that the building owners were already 
compensated by the artist because of the supposed increase in property 
value derived from the sculpture’s attachment to the building, the court 
misapplied the law.139 Even if the artwork did actually increase the 
value of the property, which seems unlikely because of the limitations 
on how an owner could use the building’s lobby, this increase would not 
qualify as compensation to the owners because they would have already 
been entitled to that value as a result of purchasing the building with 
the accompanying sculpture in the first place. As a result, any increase 
in value resulting from the artwork could not operate as compensation 
to the landowners because they will have already paid for any and all 
value when purchasing the artwork. 
B. VARA as a Per Se Physical Invasion  
In the highly contextual nature of VARA, a landowner may be 
able to successfully avoid VARA liability by arguing that, depending on 
the circumstances, certain applications of the statute result in a 
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permanent physical invasion or a regulatory taking. Despite the heavy 
burden on the landowner, this Section demonstrates that VARA may, 
in certain circumstances, result in a compensable taking. Even though 
the one court that has heard a VARA case featuring a takings argument 
(Carter) did not agree with the landowners’ claims, the court seemingly 
misapplied the relevant takings analysis, and a future defendant may 
find a more sympathetic court.140  
Even though any VARA case turns on a highly factual inquiry, 
a landowner-defendant is most likely to have success arguing that 
VARA consists of a per se physical invasion by requiring the landowner 
to maintain someone else’s property on the landowner’s property. To get 
past the temporary-permanent distinction hurdle, a VARA defendant 
should emphasize the connections between the regulation at issue in 
Loretto and the mandates set forth through VARA.141 Despite the 
Loretto regulation not having a permanent effect, the Supreme Court 
still found the regulatory action to be a permanent physical invasion 
because the cable television companies exclusively controlled the space 
occupied by the invading equipment.142 
VARA-protected artwork can be considered permanent in the 
sense that the art exclusively occupies the space attached to the 
landowner’s property.143 Any per se physical invasion has to be 
permanent for a court to award compensation.144 However, permanence 
does not necessarily mean infinite duration.145 Even though VARA 
protection only lasts for the lifetime of the author, there are many 
similarities to the regulation at issue in Loretto and VARA’s 
requirements.146 If the artwork cannot be removed from the building 
without destruction and the court enjoins the landowner from removing 
the work, the artwork effectively snaps significant sticks within the 
landowner’s bundle of property rights.147 Similar to the television 
equipment in Loretto, the artwork exclusively possesses the space that 
it invasively occupies, denying the owner the right to use the lobby or 
wall for his own purposes.148 Additionally, such a situation removes a 
landowner’s right to exclude the artist from possessing and using the 
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occupied space within the property.149 As a result, a VARA defendant 
may have a strong precedential argument, despite the fact that VARA’s 
protection is limited in duration. Still, this may be a substantial burden 
to overcome.  
If a VARA defendant is able to overcome the hurdle that is  
the permanent-temporary distinction, the likelihood of a successful 
argument increases substantially because requiring a person to 
maintain a third party’s property on someone else’s land is a per se 
physical invasion. As a matter of property theory, more than one person 
can have property rights in a specific item of property. As a result, 
VARA gives property rights in the art to the artists, despite the fact 
that the landowner clearly holds the title to the work. When a building 
has a work of VARA-protected art attached to it, both the artist and the 
building owner could hold property rights in the artwork. VARA would 
require a landowner to maintain the artist’s property on his own 
property against his will. If forced to maintain the artist’s property, the 
landowner effectively loses his rights to exclude and dispose of property 
as a result of the statute. Thus, without compensation, such an invasion 
would be an unlawful taking.  
C. VARA as a Total Regulatory Taking 
Even if a court does not consider certain applications of VARA 
as amounting to a permanent physical occupation of property, a 
landowner-defendant may still be able to argue that VARA is a 
compensable temporary regulatory taking. A regulatory taking occurs 
when a regulation’s or statute’s effect is so burdensome on a property 
owner that it equates to a direct appropriation of the property.150 In this 
analysis, the court must consider the three Penn Central factors and 
determine whether the regulation goes “too far” and results in a 
taking.151 Recall that these factors consist of the character of the 
invasion, the economic impact of the regulation on the property, and the 
property owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations.152  
Regarding the character of an invasion resulting from VARA, 
the invasion is physical in nature rather than consisting of mere 
economic adjustments.153 Under Lingle, a temporary regulatory takings 
inquiry must focus directly upon the severity of the burden that VARA 
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imposes upon a landowner’s property rights.154 Here, the critical 
question would be whether VARA is “functionally comparable to 
appropriation or invasion” of the landowner’s property.155 A regulatory 
takings argument under VARA benefits from this rule because VARA 
requires a landowner to physically maintain the invading artwork on 
the property without the ability to exclude or fully use his entire 
property.156 
A regulation may be a compensable taking if it does not advance 
a legitimate state interest, which is a low standard to meet. Here, the 
inquiry may depend on how a court interprets VARA’s purpose. If a 
court defines VARA’s purpose as protecting the interests of artists, with 
the preservation of art being a derivative purpose of the statute, there 
may be less of a legitimate state interest. Given that the state interest 
standard is a low bar, a court would likely find that VARA promotes a 
legitimate state interest and would lean against a finding of a 
compensable taking.157 However, under the Penn Central factors, no 
single factor is dispositive in a court’s determination.158 Therefore, a 
court’s finding that VARA promotes legitimate state interest does not 
lead to a certain outcome. 
Even if a regulation advances a legitimate state interest, the 
state action still may constitute a taking if it goes against an  
owner’s reasonable, investment-backed expectations.159 When buying a 
property that features attached artwork, the property owner is expected 
to have awareness of VARA’s requirements.160 However, VARA does not 
protect all artwork and instead only offers a safe harbor for works of 
recognized stature. Therefore, even though ignorance of law is no 
excuse, a landowner may reasonably believe that the artwork does not 
meet the recognized stature requirement.161 VARA itself does not define 
recognized stature but instead leaves it to judges to decided which art 
qualifies.162 There is also no requirement for artists to register their 
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works to achieve “recognized stature.”163 The question then becomes, 
are judges qualified to become certified art critics? In any event, the line 
between what may be of recognized stature and what does not qualify 
is an uncertain one. 
Outside of the murky waters of the “recognized stature” 
requirement, in order to be a compensable regulatory taking, VARA 
must still render the property at issue valueless.164 Even though the 
Palazzolo court stated that it could be possible for a diminution of value 
case to receive compensation, that seems unlikely to apply to a VARA 
case.165 While, as noted above, a landowner may attempt to argue that 
VARA is a total taking of a singular property right, most partial takings 
claims ultimately end up being characterized as total takings claims if 
the court plans to award compensation. 
As a result, a landowner may endeavor to argue that VARA 
consists of a total taking of his rights to exclude or fully use his 
property.166 While the property interest appropriated is less than the 
whole, it still may be a compensable taking.167 However, even though a 
partial takings claim is possible, most courts would likely characterize 
any partial takings claim as a total takings claim.168 In any event, as a 
practical matter, few takings claims find success when analyzed under 
the Penn Central factors.169 As a result, a VARA defendant’s best 
takings argument likely falls under the per se physical invasion 
category.  
D. A Future for VARA? 
This Note does not argue that VARA is facially unconstitutional. 
Rather, this Note contends that, in certain contexts, requiring 
landowners to maintain someone else’s artwork on their property could 
require just compensation. In order to avoid these situations, perhaps a 
court would have to firmly state that courts should prioritize and 
protect the property rights of landowners over the moral rights of 
artists. Alternatively, Congress could repeal and amend VARA to 
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remove the language of preventing destruction of the artwork attached 
to buildings from the statute.170 If Congress did amend VARA in this 
fashion, the statute would clearly indicate that landowners’ property 
rights should stand firm in the face of any moral rights that an artist 
has attached to a property. Congress could even act less drastically and 
require artists to register works of visual art with the US Copyright 
Office in order to be eligible for statutory damages, as is the case with 
all other copyrighted works.171 This requirement would more 
reasonably put the burden on landowners to check the registry before 
acting and would give all relevant parties clearer information on which 
to act in any given situation involving VARA. As the statute stands, 
there remains much uncertainty. Despite the uncertainty, as the US 
Copyright Office concluded in its 2019 study, the government feels like 
VARA is currently generally well functioning and changes are 
unlikely.172 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 serves a noble purpose of 
protecting artists’ rights and their work. However, in doing so, Congress 
inevitably gave rise to a clash of property rights in situations when 
buildings feature attached artwork. When utilized, VARA may sever 
several sticks in the landowner’s bundle of property rights, which may, 
in certain circumstances, result in a compensable taking. Even though 
the landowner faces a substantial burden in proving a taking occurred, 
the fact that the artwork physically invades a landowner’s property, 
requires the owner to maintain someone else’s property on his land, and 
gives a third party the right to control the use of another’s property, the 
landowner may still have a fighting chance.  
Proponents of VARA frequently point out that there is a low bar 
for landowners to meet to avoid any VARA liability and highlight the 
fact that ignorance of law is no excuse. However, in defense of any 
landowners that do face potential VARA liability, there are a lot of 
murky standards within the statute that can lead to unpredictable 
outcomes. If any VARA amendments ever do arise, perhaps it would 
ease the tension between traditional property rights and artists’ moral 
rights if Congress supplied more guidelines for the “recognized stature” 
requirement or potentially added a registry requirement to be eligible 
for statutory damages. As the statute stands today, however, VARA 
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does open up the possibility for a head-on collision between an artist’s 
moral rights and a landowner’s property rights, potentially bringing the 
question of when art might constitute a taking into the forefront of the 
litigation. 
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